Files
new-api/middleware/auth.go
T
Calcium-Ion 86ac0f7745 refactor: extract protocol conversion layer into standalone relaykit module (#6369)
* test(relayconvert): add golden snapshot matrix and relaykit boundary guard

Phase 0 of the relaykit extraction plan: pin byte-level output of every
registered (from,to) request/response/stream conversion route, and
forbid kit-bound packages from growing host-only imports.

* wip(relayconvert): drop gin.Context from converter signatures; add convmeta draft

Phase 1 in progress: relayconvert now takes context.Context; host media
resolver adapts gin.Context back at the service boundary.

* refactor(relayconvert): decouple converters from RelayInfo, gin, and settings

Phase 1 of the relaykit extraction plan:
- converters now depend on convmeta.Meta (implemented by RelayInfo) instead
  of *relaycommon.RelayInfo; ClaudeConvertInfo and the format guesser move
  to convmeta with aliases left behind
- host settings reach converters via a convmeta.Options snapshot built in
  RelayInfo.ConvOptions; no more model_setting/reasoning global reads inside
  the conversion layer
- effort-suffix helpers move to service/relayconvert/reasoning (old package
  forwards); chat-to-responses upgrade policy moves to service (host routing
  logic, not conversion)
- golden conversion matrix unchanged

* test(relayconvert): tighten boundary — kit packages now free of gin/setting imports

* refactor(dto): drop gin and logger dependencies

Phase 2 (part 1): dto.Request.IsStream now takes *http.Request instead of
*gin.Context (Gemini's impl reads query/path off the std request); dto's
three logger calls become common.SysError. Boundary test allowlist is now
empty — kit-bound packages import no gin/setting/logger/model.

* refactor(kit): extract dependency-free kitutil; dto/types/relayconvert stop importing common

Phase 2 of the relaykit extraction plan:
- new service/relayconvert/kitutil holds the pure helpers the kit needs
  (JSON wrappers, pointer/string/uuid/timestamp utils, MaskSensitiveInfo,
  pluggable LogInfo/LogError hooks, Debug flag)
- dto, types, and all relayconvert packages now use kitutil; their only
  remaining internal deps are dto/types/constant
- common keeps every original symbol (MaskSensitiveInfo delegates to
  kitutil) so host code is untouched; main.go routes kit logging into
  common.SysLog/SysError and mirrors DebugEnabled
- golden conversion matrix unchanged

* refactor(kit): move EndpointType/FinishReason to types; OpenRouter dialect via Options

Kit packages (dto/types/relayconvert/reasonmap) no longer import constant:
- EndpointType and finish-reason values live in types; constant re-exports
- the OpenRouter special-case in claude->openai request conversion reads
  Options.OpenRouterDialect, set by the host from the channel type;
  InitChannelMeta invalidates the cached snapshot on channel switch

* refactor: extract relaykit submodule (dto/types/relayconvert/reasonmap)

Phase 3 of the relaykit extraction plan:
- new go module github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/relaykit containing dto
  (minus task family), types, relayconvert (with convmeta/kitutil/reasoning),
  and reasonmap; host consumes it via require + replace, go.work for dev
- task-family dto (task/suno/midjourney/video) stays in the host dto
  package; dual-consumer host files alias it as taskdto
- relaykit builds and tests standalone (GOWORK=off): no host imports,
  no gin, no DB, no settings
- golden conversion matrix unchanged

* build(docker): copy relaykit/go.mod before go mod download

The local-replace submodule's go.mod must exist inside the build context
for the main module graph to resolve.

* fix: address relaykit extraction regressions

* fix: address relaykit review regressions

* docs: document Meta nil receiver contract

* fix(relaykit): fail OpenAI→Claude conversion without max_tokens; reject negative default_max_tokens

The Claude Messages API requires max_tokens (omitting it is a 400
"Field required"), but with a nil Options.Claude.DefaultMaxTokens hook
the converters silently emitted a request the upstream is guaranteed to
reject. Both OpenAI Chat and Responses → Claude conversions now return
sharedclaude.ErrMissingMaxTokens when no path (client value, default
hook, thinking-adapter floor) supplied one. Unreachable in the host,
which always configures the hook.

Host side, claude.default_max_tokens now rejects negative values at the
option API before persisting — they would wrap into huge unsigned values
during conversion. Zero stays allowed: the current API treats
max_tokens: 0 as cache pre-warming.

* fix: make Gemini safety settings read path race-free
2026-07-27 15:56:21 +08:00

516 lines
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package middleware
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"strings"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/common"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/constant"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/i18n"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/logger"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/model"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/relaykit/types"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/service"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/service/authz"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/setting/ratio_setting"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"gorm.io/gorm"
)
const authIdentityContextKey = "auth_identity"
type dashboardCredentialKind int
const (
dashboardCredentialUnmatched dashboardCredentialKind = iota
dashboardCredentialInternal
dashboardCredentialPAT
)
func validUserInfo(username string, role int) bool {
// check username is empty
if strings.TrimSpace(username) == "" {
return false
}
if !common.IsValidateRole(role) {
return false
}
return true
}
func authHelper(c *gin.Context, minRole int) {
user, identity, useAccessToken, err := authenticateDashboardRequest(c)
if err != nil {
writeDashboardAuthError(c, err)
return
}
if user.Status != common.UserStatusEnabled {
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"success": false, "code": "AUTH_USER_DISABLED", "message": common.TranslateMessage(c, i18n.MsgAuthUserBanned)})
return
}
if user.Role < minRole {
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"success": false, "code": "AUTH_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE", "message": common.TranslateMessage(c, i18n.MsgAuthInsufficientPrivilege)})
return
}
if !validUserInfo(user.Username, user.Role) {
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"success": false, "code": "AUTH_USER_INVALID", "message": common.TranslateMessage(c, i18n.MsgAuthUserInfoInvalid)})
return
}
setDashboardAuthContext(c, user, identity, useAccessToken)
// 管理/root 写操作审计兜底:内聚在鉴权链路里,保证任何经过 AdminAuth/RootAuth
// 的写接口都会自动留痕(无需在路由上单独挂审计中间件,避免漏挂)。
// handler 内手动埋点者会设置 ContextKeyAuditLoggedfinishAdminAudit 据此跳过。
var auditWriter *auditResponseWriter
if minRole >= common.RoleAdminUser {
auditWriter = beginAdminAudit(c)
}
c.Next()
finishAdminAudit(c, auditWriter)
}
func TryUserAuth() func(c *gin.Context) {
return func(c *gin.Context) {
user, identity, credentialKind, err := classifyDashboardCredential(c)
if err != nil {
writeDashboardAuthError(c, err)
return
}
if credentialKind != dashboardCredentialUnmatched {
setDashboardAuthContext(c, user, identity, credentialKind == dashboardCredentialPAT)
}
c.Next()
}
}
func UserAuth() func(c *gin.Context) {
return func(c *gin.Context) {
authHelper(c, common.RoleCommonUser)
}
}
func AdminAuth() func(c *gin.Context) {
return func(c *gin.Context) {
authHelper(c, common.RoleAdminUser)
}
}
func RootAuth() func(c *gin.Context) {
return func(c *gin.Context) {
authHelper(c, common.RoleRootUser)
}
}
// GetAuthIdentity returns a dashboard session identity. PAT-authenticated
// requests intentionally have no SessionID and cannot manage browser sessions.
func GetAuthIdentity(c *gin.Context) (service.AuthIdentity, bool) {
value, ok := c.Get(authIdentityContextKey)
if !ok {
return service.AuthIdentity{}, false
}
identity, ok := value.(service.AuthIdentity)
return identity, ok
}
// GetSessionAuthIdentity returns only identities backed by a live dashboard
// session. PAT-authenticated requests intentionally fail this check.
func GetSessionAuthIdentity(c *gin.Context) (service.AuthIdentity, bool) {
identity, ok := GetAuthIdentity(c)
if !ok {
identity = service.AuthIdentity{
UserID: c.GetInt("id"),
SessionID: c.GetString("session_id"),
UserAuthVersion: c.GetInt64("auth_version"),
SessionVersion: c.GetInt64("session_version"),
}
}
if identity.UserID <= 0 || identity.SessionID == "" || identity.UserAuthVersion <= 0 || identity.SessionVersion <= 0 {
return service.AuthIdentity{}, false
}
return identity, true
}
func authenticateDashboardRequest(c *gin.Context) (*model.UserBase, service.AuthIdentity, bool, error) {
user, identity, credentialKind, err := classifyDashboardCredential(c)
if err != nil {
return nil, service.AuthIdentity{}, credentialKind == dashboardCredentialPAT, err
}
if credentialKind == dashboardCredentialUnmatched {
return nil, service.AuthIdentity{}, false, service.ErrAuthTokenInvalid
}
return user, identity, credentialKind == dashboardCredentialPAT, nil
}
func classifyDashboardCredential(c *gin.Context) (*model.UserBase, service.AuthIdentity, dashboardCredentialKind, error) {
raw, ok := authorizationToken(c.GetHeader("Authorization"))
if !ok {
return nil, service.AuthIdentity{}, dashboardCredentialUnmatched, nil
}
identity, internal, err := service.ParseDashboardAccessToken(raw)
if internal {
if err != nil {
return nil, service.AuthIdentity{}, dashboardCredentialInternal, err
}
_, user, err := service.ValidateLoginSession(identity)
if err != nil {
return nil, service.AuthIdentity{}, dashboardCredentialInternal, err
}
return user, identity, dashboardCredentialInternal, nil
}
patUser, err := model.ValidateAccessToken(raw)
if err != nil {
return nil, service.AuthIdentity{}, dashboardCredentialPAT, err
}
if patUser == nil || patUser.Id <= 0 {
return nil, service.AuthIdentity{}, dashboardCredentialUnmatched, nil
}
user, err := model.GetUserCache(patUser.Id)
if err != nil {
return nil, service.AuthIdentity{}, dashboardCredentialPAT, err
}
return user, service.AuthIdentity{UserID: user.Id, UserAuthVersion: user.AuthVersion}, dashboardCredentialPAT, nil
}
func authorizationToken(header string) (string, bool) {
header = strings.TrimSpace(header)
if header == "" {
return "", false
}
parts := strings.Fields(header)
if len(parts) == 2 && strings.EqualFold(parts[0], "Bearer") {
header = parts[1]
} else if len(parts) != 1 {
return "", false
}
return header, header != ""
}
func setDashboardAuthContext(c *gin.Context, user *model.UserBase, identity service.AuthIdentity, useAccessToken bool) {
c.Header("Auth-Version", "864b7076dbcd0a3c01b5520316720ebf")
c.Set("username", user.Username)
c.Set("role", user.Role)
c.Set("id", user.Id)
c.Set("group", user.Group)
c.Set("user_group", user.Group)
c.Set("use_access_token", useAccessToken)
c.Set("session_id", identity.SessionID)
c.Set("auth_version", identity.UserAuthVersion)
c.Set("session_version", identity.SessionVersion)
c.Set(authIdentityContextKey, identity)
user.WriteContext(c)
}
func writeDashboardAuthError(c *gin.Context, err error) {
if errors.Is(err, service.ErrAuthTokenExpired) {
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"success": false, "code": "AUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRED", "message": common.TranslateMessage(c, i18n.MsgAuthNotLoggedIn)})
return
}
if errors.Is(err, service.ErrLoginSessionRevoked) || errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"success": false, "code": "AUTH_SESSION_REVOKED", "message": common.TranslateMessage(c, i18n.MsgAuthNotLoggedIn)})
return
}
if errors.Is(err, service.ErrAuthTokenInvalid) {
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"success": false, "code": "AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED", "message": common.TranslateMessage(c, i18n.MsgAuthAccessTokenInvalid)})
return
}
common.SysLog("dashboard authentication error: " + err.Error())
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"success": false, "code": "AUTH_INTERNAL_ERROR", "message": common.TranslateMessage(c, i18n.MsgDatabaseError)})
}
func RequirePermission(permission authz.Permission) func(c *gin.Context) {
return func(c *gin.Context) {
role := c.GetInt("role")
userID := c.GetInt("id")
if authz.Can(userID, role, permission) {
c.Next()
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{
"success": false,
"message": common.TranslateMessage(c, i18n.MsgAuthInsufficientPrivilege),
})
c.Abort()
}
}
func WssAuth(c *gin.Context) {
}
// TokenOrUserAuth allows either session-based user auth or API token auth.
// Used for endpoints that need to be accessible from both the dashboard and API clients.
func TokenOrUserAuth() func(c *gin.Context) {
return func(c *gin.Context) {
raw, ok := authorizationToken(c.GetHeader("Authorization"))
if ok {
identity, internal, err := service.ParseDashboardAccessToken(raw)
if !internal {
TokenAuth()(c)
return
}
if err != nil {
writeDashboardAuthError(c, err)
return
}
_, user, err := service.ValidateLoginSession(identity)
if err != nil {
writeDashboardAuthError(c, err)
return
}
setDashboardAuthContext(c, user, identity, false)
c.Next()
return
}
// Opaque credentials are relay API keys here, never dashboard PATs.
TokenAuth()(c)
}
}
// TokenAuthReadOnly 宽松版本的令牌认证中间件,用于只读查询接口。
// 只验证令牌 key 是否存在,不检查令牌状态、过期时间和额度。
// 即使令牌已过期、已耗尽或已禁用,也允许访问。
// 仍然检查用户是否被封禁。
func TokenAuthReadOnly() func(c *gin.Context) {
return func(c *gin.Context) {
key := c.Request.Header.Get("Authorization")
if key == "" {
c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{
"success": false,
"message": common.TranslateMessage(c, i18n.MsgTokenNotProvided),
})
c.Abort()
return
}
if strings.HasPrefix(key, "Bearer ") || strings.HasPrefix(key, "bearer ") {
key = strings.TrimSpace(key[7:])
}
key = strings.TrimPrefix(key, "sk-")
parts := strings.Split(key, "-")
key = parts[0]
token, err := model.GetTokenByKey(key, false)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{
"success": false,
"message": common.TranslateMessage(c, i18n.MsgTokenInvalid),
})
} else {
common.SysLog("TokenAuthReadOnly GetTokenByKey database error: " + err.Error())
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{
"success": false,
"message": common.TranslateMessage(c, i18n.MsgDatabaseError),
})
}
c.Abort()
return
}
// TokenAuthReadOnly must keep allowing other token states to query read-only
// data, such as token usage logs; only explicitly disabled tokens are denied.
if token.Status == common.TokenStatusDisabled {
c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{
"success": false,
"message": common.TranslateMessage(c, i18n.MsgTokenStatusUnavailable),
})
c.Abort()
return
}
userCache, err := model.GetUserCache(token.UserId)
if err != nil {
common.SysLog(fmt.Sprintf("TokenAuthReadOnly GetUserCache error for user %d: %v", token.UserId, err))
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{
"success": false,
"message": common.TranslateMessage(c, i18n.MsgDatabaseError),
})
c.Abort()
return
}
if userCache.Status != common.UserStatusEnabled {
c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{
"success": false,
"message": common.TranslateMessage(c, i18n.MsgAuthUserBanned),
})
c.Abort()
return
}
c.Set("id", token.UserId)
c.Set("token_id", token.Id)
c.Set("token_key", token.Key)
c.Next()
}
}
func TokenAuth() func(c *gin.Context) {
return func(c *gin.Context) {
// 先检测是否为ws
if c.Request.Header.Get("Sec-WebSocket-Protocol") != "" {
// Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: realtime, openai-insecure-api-key.sk-xxx, openai-beta.realtime-v1
// read sk from Sec-WebSocket-Protocol
key := c.Request.Header.Get("Sec-WebSocket-Protocol")
parts := strings.Split(key, ",")
for _, part := range parts {
part = strings.TrimSpace(part)
if strings.HasPrefix(part, "openai-insecure-api-key") {
key = strings.TrimPrefix(part, "openai-insecure-api-key.")
break
}
}
c.Request.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+key)
}
// 检查path包含/v1/messages 或 /v1/models
if strings.Contains(c.Request.URL.Path, "/v1/messages") || strings.Contains(c.Request.URL.Path, "/v1/models") {
anthropicKey := c.Request.Header.Get("x-api-key")
if anthropicKey != "" {
c.Request.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+anthropicKey)
}
}
// gemini api 从query中获取key
if strings.HasPrefix(c.Request.URL.Path, "/v1beta/models") ||
strings.HasPrefix(c.Request.URL.Path, "/v1beta/openai/models") ||
strings.HasPrefix(c.Request.URL.Path, "/v1/models/") {
skKey := c.Query("key")
if skKey != "" {
c.Request.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+skKey)
}
// 从x-goog-api-key header中获取key
xGoogKey := c.Request.Header.Get("x-goog-api-key")
if xGoogKey != "" {
c.Request.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+xGoogKey)
}
}
key := c.Request.Header.Get("Authorization")
parts := make([]string, 0)
if strings.HasPrefix(key, "Bearer ") || strings.HasPrefix(key, "bearer ") {
key = strings.TrimSpace(key[7:])
}
if key == "" || key == "midjourney-proxy" {
key = c.Request.Header.Get("mj-api-secret")
if strings.HasPrefix(key, "Bearer ") || strings.HasPrefix(key, "bearer ") {
key = strings.TrimSpace(key[7:])
}
key = strings.TrimPrefix(key, "sk-")
parts = strings.Split(key, "-")
key = parts[0]
} else {
key = strings.TrimPrefix(key, "sk-")
parts = strings.Split(key, "-")
key = parts[0]
}
token, err := model.ValidateUserToken(key)
if token != nil {
id := c.GetInt("id")
if id == 0 {
c.Set("id", token.UserId)
}
}
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, model.ErrDatabase) {
common.SysLog("TokenAuth ValidateUserToken database error: " + err.Error())
abortWithOpenAiMessage(c, http.StatusInternalServerError,
common.TranslateMessage(c, i18n.MsgDatabaseError))
} else {
abortWithOpenAiMessage(c, http.StatusUnauthorized,
common.TranslateMessage(c, i18n.MsgTokenInvalid))
}
return
}
allowIps := token.GetIpLimits()
if len(allowIps) > 0 {
clientIp := c.ClientIP()
logger.LogDebug(c, "Token has IP restrictions, checking client IP %s", clientIp)
ip := net.ParseIP(clientIp)
if ip == nil {
abortWithOpenAiMessage(c, http.StatusForbidden, "无法解析客户端 IP 地址")
return
}
if common.IsIpInCIDRList(ip, allowIps) == false {
abortWithOpenAiMessage(c, http.StatusForbidden, "您的 IP 不在令牌允许访问的列表中", types.ErrorCodeAccessDenied)
return
}
logger.LogDebug(c, "Client IP %s passed the token IP restrictions check", clientIp)
}
userCache, err := model.GetUserCache(token.UserId)
if err != nil {
common.SysLog(fmt.Sprintf("TokenAuth GetUserCache error for user %d: %v", token.UserId, err))
abortWithOpenAiMessage(c, http.StatusInternalServerError,
common.TranslateMessage(c, i18n.MsgDatabaseError))
return
}
userEnabled := userCache.Status == common.UserStatusEnabled
if !userEnabled {
abortWithOpenAiMessage(c, http.StatusForbidden, common.TranslateMessage(c, i18n.MsgAuthUserBanned))
return
}
userCache.WriteContext(c)
userGroup := userCache.Group
tokenGroup := token.Group
if tokenGroup != "" {
// check common.UserUsableGroups[userGroup]
if _, ok := service.GetUserUsableGroups(userGroup)[tokenGroup]; !ok {
abortWithOpenAiMessage(c, http.StatusForbidden, fmt.Sprintf("无权访问 %s 分组", tokenGroup))
return
}
// check group in common.GroupRatio
if !ratio_setting.ContainsGroupRatio(tokenGroup) {
if tokenGroup != "auto" {
abortWithOpenAiMessage(c, http.StatusForbidden, fmt.Sprintf("分组 %s 已被弃用", tokenGroup))
return
}
}
userGroup = tokenGroup
}
common.SetContextKey(c, constant.ContextKeyUsingGroup, userGroup)
err = SetupContextForToken(c, token, parts...)
if err != nil {
return
}
c.Next()
}
}
func SetupContextForToken(c *gin.Context, token *model.Token, parts ...string) error {
if token == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("token is nil")
}
c.Set("id", token.UserId)
c.Set("token_id", token.Id)
c.Set("token_key", token.Key)
c.Set("token_name", token.Name)
c.Set("token_unlimited_quota", token.UnlimitedQuota)
if !token.UnlimitedQuota {
c.Set("token_quota", token.RemainQuota)
}
if token.ModelLimitsEnabled {
c.Set("token_model_limit_enabled", true)
c.Set("token_model_limit", token.GetModelLimitsMap())
} else {
c.Set("token_model_limit_enabled", false)
}
common.SetContextKey(c, constant.ContextKeyTokenGroup, token.Group)
common.SetContextKey(c, constant.ContextKeyTokenCrossGroupRetry, token.CrossGroupRetry)
if len(parts) > 1 {
if model.IsAdmin(token.UserId) {
c.Set("specific_channel_id", parts[1])
} else {
c.Header("specific_channel_version", "701e3ae1dc3f7975556d354e0675168d004891c8")
abortWithOpenAiMessage(c, http.StatusForbidden, "普通用户不支持指定渠道")
return fmt.Errorf("普通用户不支持指定渠道")
}
}
return nil
}